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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
PER CURIAM: 
 
The Camden County Board of Chosen Freeholders 
(hereinafter "Camden County") contends that handgun 
manufacturers, because of their marketing and distribution 
policies and practices, are liable under a public nuisance 
theory for the governmental costs associated with the 
criminal use of handguns in Camden County. The District 
Court, in a 53-page opinion, dismissed the complaint. See 
 
                                4 
  
Camden County Board of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta 
U.S.A., Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d. 245 (D.N.J. 2000). We affirm 
the order of the District Court. 
 
I. 
 
In its Second Amended Complaint, Camden County 
alleged that Defendants' conduct -- the marketing and 
distribution of handguns -- created and contributed to the 
widespread criminal use of handguns in the County. See 
Camden County v. Beretta, 123 F. Supp. 2d. at 250. The 
County invoked three theories of liability: negligence, 
negligent entrustment, and public nuisance. The County 
requested several forms of relief, including compensation 
for the additional costs incurred by the County to abate the 
alleged public nuisance (costs borne by the County's 
prosecutor, sheriff, medical examiner, park police, 
correctional facility, and courts); an injunction requiring the 
manufacturers to change their marketing and distribution 
practices; and other compensatory and punitive damages. 
The manufacturers countered that the County had failed to 
state claims on which relief could be granted and that, in 
any event, damages were barred by the municipal cost 
recovery rule. Moreover, the manufacturers contended that 
the claims were barred by New Jersey's product liability 
statute, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and the Due 
Process Clause. 
 
The District Court rejected all three of Camden County's 
theories of liability and granted the defendants' motion to 
dismiss the complaint. It dismissed the two negligence 
claims after its thorough six-factor analysis found 
proximate cause lacking. See Camden County v. Beretta, 
123 F. Supp. 2d. at 259-64. It also found that the public 
nuisance claim was defective because the County had not 
alleged "the required element that the defendants exercised 
control over the nuisance to be abated." Id.  at 266. 
 
On appeal, Camden County has dropped the two 
negligence claims and pursues only the public nuisance 
claim. The County alleges that the manufacturers' conduct 
endangered public safety, health, and peace, and imposed 
inordinate financial burdens on the County's fisc. It argues 
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that the defendants "knowingly facilitated, participated in, 
and maintain a handgun distribution system that provides 
criminals and youth easy access to handguns." Appellant's 
Brief at 2. Relying on general data about the marketing and 
distribution of handguns, the County argues that 
Defendants knowingly created the public nuisance of 
"criminals and youth with handguns." Appellant's Brief at 
3 (emphasis in original). 
 
The County makes the following pertinent factual 
allegations: the manufacturers release into the market 
substantially more handguns than they expect to sell to 
law-abiding purchasers; the manufacturers continue to use 
certain distribution channels, despite knowing (often from 
specific crime-gun trace reports produced by the federal 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms) that those 
channels regularly yield criminal end-users; the 
manufacturers do not limit the number, purpose, or 
frequency of handgun purchases and do not supervise 
these sales or require their distributors to do so; the 
manufacturers' contracts with distributors do not penalize 
distributor practices that facilitate criminal access to 
handguns; the manufacturers design, produce, and 
advertise handguns in ways that facilitate sales to and use 
by criminals; the manufacturers receive significant revenue 
from the crime market, which in turn generates more sales 
to law-abiding persons wishing to protect themselves; and 
the manufacturers fail to take reasonable measures to 
mitigate the harm to Camden County. Appellant's Brief at 
4-5. The County makes no allegation that any 
manufacturer violated any federal or state statute or 
regulation governing the manufacture and distribution of 
firearms, and no direct link is alleged between any 
manufacturer and any specific criminal act. 
 
The manufacturers respond that the County's factual 
allegations amount to the following attenuated chain of 
events: (1) the manufacturers produce firearms at their 
places of business; (2) they sell the firearms to federally 
licensed distributors; (3) those distributors sell them to 
federally licensed dealers; (4) some of the firearms are later 
diverted by unnamed third parties into an illegal gun 
market, which spills into Camden County; (5) the diverted 
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firearms are obtained by unnamed third parties who are 
not entitled to own or possess them; (6) these firearms are 
then used in criminal acts that kill and wound County 
residents; and (7) this harm causes the County to expend 
resources to prevent or respond to those crimes. Appellees' 
Brief at 3. The manufacturers note that in this chain, they 
are six steps removed from the criminal end-users. 
Moreover, the fourth link in this chain consists of acts 
committed by intervening third parties who divert some 
handguns into an illegal market. 
 
II. 
 
Because this appeal presents a question of state law, we 
do not find it necessary to write at length. In brief, we agree 
with the District Court that the County has failed to state 
a valid public nuisance claim under New Jersey law. 
 
A. 
 
A public nuisance is " `an unreasonable interference with 
a right common to the general public.' " Philadelphia Elec. 
Co. v. Hercules, Inc. 762 F.2d 303, 315 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts S 821B(1) (1979)); 
see also Mayor & Council of Borough of Alpine v. Brewster, 
80 A.2d 297, 300 (N.J. 1951). For the interference to be 
actionable, the defendant must exert a certain degree of 
control over its source. See New Jersey Dept. of Envt'l Prot. 
v. Exxon Corp., 376 A.2d 1339, 1349 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1977). 
 
Traditionally, the scope of nuisance claims has been 
limited to interference connected with real property or 
infringement of public rights. See W. Page Keeton et al., 
Prosser and Keeton on Torts S 86 at 617-18 (5th ed. 1984). 
In this 1984 edition of the hornbook, the authors lamented 
that "[t]here is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the 
entire law than that which surrounds the word `nuisance.' 
It has meant all things to all people, and has been applied 
indiscriminately to everything from an alarming 
advertisement to a cockroach baked in a pie." Id. at 616. 
They recommended dismissal of nuisance claims "not 
connected with land or with any public right, as mere 
aberration, adding to the vagueness of an already uncertain 
 
                                7 
  
word. Unless the facts can be brought within one of the two 
categories mentioned, there is not, with any accurate use of 
the term, a nuisance." Id. at 618-19. Since that edition, the 
scope of nuisance law appears to have returned to its more 
narrow focus on these two traditional areas, as courts 
"across the nation have begun to refine the types of cases 
amenable to a nuisance theory." City of Philadelphia v. 
Beretta, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 909. 
 
Whatever the precise scope of public nuisance law in New 
Jersey may be, no New Jersey court has ever allowed a 
public nuisance claim to proceed against manufacturers for 
lawful products that are lawfully placed in the stream of 
commerce. On the contrary, the courts have enforced the 
boundary between the well-developed body of product 
liability law and public nuisance law. Otherwise, if public 
nuisance law were permitted to encompass product 
liability, nuisance law "would become a monster that would 
devour in one gulp the entire law of tort." Tioga Public Sch. 
Dist. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 984 F.2d 915, 921 (8th Cir. 
1993).  If defective products are not a public nuisance as a 
matter of law, then the non-defective, lawful products at 
issue in this case cannot be a nuisance without straining 
the law to absurdity. 
 
B. 
 
Within the narrower context of similar tort actions 
against handgun manufacturers around the country, a 
majority of courts have rejected these claims as a matter of 
law.1 In a few other courts, the claim was not dismissed 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. See, e.g., Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 
3330 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999), aff'd 258 Conn. 313 (2001); Merrill v. 
Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001); Sills v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 
2000 Del. Super. LEXIS 444 (2000), cert. denied, 768 A.2d 471 (Del. 
2001); City of Gary, Indiana v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 2001 WL 333111 
(Ind. Super. Ct. 2001); Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., et al., 96 
N.Y.2d 
222 (N.Y. 2001) (answering questions certified from the Second Circuit, 
which then entered judgment accordingly in Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. 
Corp., et al., 264 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2001)); City of Cincinnati v. Beretta 
U.S.A. Corp., 1999 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 27 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1999), aff'd, 
2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3601 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000); Penelas v. Arms Tech., 
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outright, but each such case is distinguishable from the 
instant case.2 To extend public nuisance law to embrace 
the manufacture of handguns would be unprecedented 
under New Jersey state law and unprecedented nationwide 
for an appellate court. See City of Philadelphia , 126 F. 
Supp. 2d at 910. 
 
Even if public nuisance law could be stretched far 
enough to encompass the lawful distribution of lawful 
products, the County has failed to allege that the 
manufacturers exercise sufficient control over the source of 
the interference with the public right. The District Court 
found this to be the "fatal defect" of the County's claim. 
Camden County v. Beretta, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 266. The 
County argues that proximate cause, remoteness, and 
control are not essential to a public nuisance claim, i.e., 
that conduct that merely contributes to the source of the 
interference can be sufficient. But the relevant case law 
shows that, even if the requisite element is not always 
termed "control," the New Jersey courts in fact require a 
degree of control by the defendant over the source of the 
interference that is absent here.3 
 
To connect the manufacture of handguns with municipal 
crime-fighting costs requires, as noted above, a chain of 
seven links. This causal chain is simply too attenuated to 
attribute sufficient control to the manufacturers to make 
out a public nuisance claim. In the initial steps, the 
manufacturers produce lawful handguns and make lawful 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Inc., 1999 WL 1204353 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1999), aff'd, 778 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 2000 WL 248364 
(La. Civ. Dist. Ct. 2000), rev'd, 785 So. 2d 1 (La. 2001); City of 
Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 126 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Pa. 
2000). 
 
2. See White v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 816 (N.D. Ohio 
2000) (contradicting the state court's ruling in City of Cincinnati v. 
Beretta, which was subsequently affirmed on appeal); City of Boston v. 
Smith & Wesson Corp., 2000 Mass. Super. LEXIS 352 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
2000) (characterizing the plaintiffs' legal theory as "extreme" and 
"unique 
in the Commonwealth," id. at *14). 
 
3. See, e.g., Cogliati v. Ecco High Frequency Corp., 456 A.2d 524, 530 
(N.J. 1983); Milstrey v. City of Hackensack, 79 A.2d 37 (N.J. 1951). 
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sales to federally licensed gun distributors, who in turn 
lawfully sell those handguns to federally licensed dealers. 
Further down the chain, independent third parties, over 
whom the manufacturers have no control, divert handguns 
to unauthorized owners and criminal use. The 
manufacturers may not be held responsible "without a 
more tangible showing that the defendants were a direct 
link the causal chain that resulted in the plaintiffs' injuries, 
and that the defendants were realistically in a position to 
prevent the wrongs." Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp. et al., 
96 N.Y.2d 222, 234 (2001) (finding no duty because gun 
manufacturers did not control criminals with guns, and 
injuries were too remote). 
 
A public-nuisance defendant can bring its own conduct 
or activities at a particular physical site under control. But 
the limited ability of a defendant to exercise control beyond 
its sphere of immediate activity may explain why public 
nuisance law has traditionally been confined to real 
property and violations of public rights. In the negligence 
context, this Court recently held that a defendant has no 
duty to control the misconduct of third parties. See Port 
Authority v. Arcadian Corp., 189 F.3d 305, 312-17 (3d. Cir. 
1999). We agree with the District Court that this logic is 
equally compelling when applied in the public nuisance 
context. See Camden County v. Beretta, 123 F. Supp. at 
266. If independent third parties cause the nuisance, 
parties that have not controlled or created the nuisance are 
not liable. See New Jersey Dept. of Envt'l Prot. v. Exxon 
Corp., 376 A.2d 1339, 1349 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1977). 
 
Public nuisance is a matter of state law, and the role of 
a federal court ruling on a matter of state law in a diversity 
case is to follow the precedents of the state's highest court 
and predict how that court would decide the issue 
presented. It is not the role of a federal court to expand or 
narrow state law in ways not foreshadowed by state 
precedent. Here, no New Jersey precedents support the 
County's public nuisance claim or provide a sound basis for 
predicting that the Supreme Court of New Jersey would 
find that claim to be valid. While it is of course conceivable 
that the Supreme Court of New Jersey may someday choose 
to expand state public nuisance law in the manner that the 
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County urges, we cannot predict at this time that it will do 
so. 
 
III 
 
Because Camden County failed to state a cognizable 
public nuisance claim against the gun manufacturers 
under New Jersey law, the District Court's order dismissing 
the County's complaint is AFFIRMED. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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